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Abstract A substantial literature indicates that the public school system in the United States is
inefficient. Some have posited that this inefticiency arises from a lack of competition in the education
market. On the other hand, the Tiebout hypothesis suggests that public schools may already face
signiticant competition. In this paper, the authors examine the extent to which competition for
students intluences public school ineftlciency in Texas. They use a Shephard input distance function
to model educational production and use bootstrapping techniques to examine allocative inefficiencies.
Switching regressions estimation suggests that school districts in noncompetitive metropolitan areas
are more than twice as allocatively ineftlcient as school districts in competitive metropolitan areas.
. The authors would like to thank Steven Craig, R. Hamilton Lankford, Robert Meyer, Kim
Rueben, Joe Stone, Kimberly Zieschang and tbe seminar participants at Tulane University for
extensive comments on this paper and earlier drafts. Thomas Fomby, Joseph Hirschberg and
Esfandiar Maasoumi oftered considerable econometric advice. Of course, all remaining errors are
tbeir own. Please note that the views expressed in this paper do not necessarily renect those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.~:
I. Introduction
A substantial literature indicates that the public school system in the United States is ineft1cient.
Hanushek's 1986 survey of the literature on educational production functions overwhelmingly
concludes that expenditures are uncorrelated with student achievement gains. Cost function studies
and data envelopment analyses support similar conclusions (see, for example, Bessent et al. 1982,
Fare, et al. 1989 or Callan and Santerre 1990).
Some have posited that this ineft1ciency arises from a lack ofcompetition in the education market.
Chubb and Moe (1990 and 1991) find evidence that administrative autonomy fosters school efficiency
and argue that increased competition among schools would promote such autonomy. Other
researcbers attribute school inefficiency to the monopoly powers ofthe public school system (for
examples, see Boaz 1991 or Gwartney 1991). Couch, Shughart and Williams (1993) and Hoxby
(l994a) tlnd evidence that student performance in public schools is lower when there is less
competition from private schools.
On the other hand, public schools in the U.S. may already face signif1cant competition inthe
sense ofTiebout (1956). A number of researchers have demonstrated that a greater variety of public
schools in a metropolitan area leads, ceteris paribus, to increased homogeneity within local
jurisdictions, (Hamilton et al. 1975, Eberts and Gronberg 1981, Gramlich and Rubinfeld 1982,
Munley 1982 and Grubb 1982). Iud (1983) demonstrates that residents express their preferences for
public schools by voting with their feet. Martinez-Vazquez and Seaman (1985) tlnd that private
schools are less prevalent in communities with a variety of public school choices. Hoxby (l994b) and
Borland and Howsen (1993) find evidence that Herfindahl indices of competition for student
enrollment can explain some of the variation in educational production.
To evaluate directly the connection between school etliciency and competition for students, we
model the multiple output, multiple input school production technology using a Shephard (1953) input2
distance function. By bootstrapping the distance function, we can test for allocative inefficiencies in
educational production. We tind evidence that competition for students signiticantly reduces the
allocative ineftlciency of Texas school districts.
II. The Literature
Over the years, economists have used a variety of techniques to evaluate school performance.
Most researchers have focused on estimating single-output, average production functions for
schooling. Although a few recent studies have examined monetary returns to schooling (Betts 1995
and Card and Krueger I992a, 1992b), the most common measures ofeducational outputs have been
test scores (for examples, see Berger and Toma 1994, Eberts and Stone 1987, Wahlberg and Fowler
1987 and the literature surveyed in Hanushek 1986). Generally, researchers assume that schools
produce these educational outputs using inputs related to school personnel, per-pupil expenditures, and
family background.'
The production functions yield estimates ofthe marginal products of the inputs, and allow
researchers to infer which inputs would have the greatest marginal impact on achievement.' Most
researchers using this approach have found that inputs within school district control (such as
expenditures or class sizes) have little or no marginal impact on test scores (Hanushek 1986). Card
and Krueger (1992a, 1992b) find evidence that school inputs have a positive effect on the monetary
returns to schooling, but their analysis is based on state-level data aboutschool characteristics and
may be subject to aggregation bias (see Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor 1996). Using less aggregate
data, Betts (1995) tinds no evidence of marginal enects.
'See Cohn and Geske (1990) for athorough review of the output and input measures
employed in these types of studies,
'See Levin (1974) and Hanushek (1979) for critical reviews of the production function
approach.3
Recently, some researchers have modified production function analysis to incorporate allocative
and technical inefficiencies, and mUltiple measures of educational output. Most of the researchers
using this generalized approach have relied on nonstochastic techniques like data envelopment analysis
,
(e,g., Bessent and Bessent 1980; Bessent et al. 1982, 1984; Fare et al. 1989; and Grosskopf et al.
1994). However, a few researchers have used stochastic techniques. Deller and Rudnicki (1993)
assume that school inefficiency has a half-normal distribution and use maximum likelihood techniques
to estimate a single-output frontier production function. McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993) and Ray
(1991) combine DEA and regression analysis in a partially stochastic two-step procedure that
incorporates multiple outputs.' Grosskopf et al. (1997) use an indirect output distance function to
examine the consequences of budgetary reforms when school districts are inefficient. Like the
production-function analyses, these studies, generally find evidence ofsubstantial school inefficiency.
Analyses of educational cost functions yield similar results.' Barrow (1991) estimated a cost
function frontier for schools in England and found that actual costs were 4 percent to 16 percent
above the minimum estimated cost for the schools in his sample. Callan and Santerre (1990) found
evidence that school districts in Connecticut produce primary and secondary education using
inefficiently large quantities of capital and transportation services. Jimenez (1986) concluded that
schools in Bolivia and Paraguay used excessive amounts of capital and that many of the schools in
Bolivia exhibited diseconomies of scale. Eberts and Stone (1986) found that rent extraction in the
form of higher teacher salaries adds between 7 percent and 15 percent to educational costs in
unionized school districts in the United States.
'In the first step, they construct efficiency measures for schools by applying DEA to data
on multiple educational outcomes and discretionary inputs (such as teachers and
administrators). In the second step, they regress the efficiency measures on a set of non-
discretionary inputs (such as student body characteristics).4
III. The Distance Function
We use a Shephard (1953) input distance function to model school production and generate
measures of allocative inefficiency. The input distance function is a convenient tool for analyzing
potentially inefficient public enterprises for a number of reasons. Because the distance function is
dual to the cost function, it lends itself to fully stochastic frontier estimation without sacrificing the
ability to evaluate multiple outputs. However, the input distance function requires data on input
quantities rather than input prices. Thus, the distance function is preferable in cross-section settings
where prices do not vary, such as when making comparisons across schools within a single labor
market. The distance function also bas the advantage for our purposes of being "agnostic" with
respect to the economic motivation of the decision maker, unlike the cost function which presumes
cost minimizing behavior.4
Formally, the input distance function.js a mapping from the set of all nonnegative input vectors x
= (x I' x2, ..., xN ) and nonnegative output vectors y = (YI, Y2, ..., YM) into the real line, i.e.,
D(y,x)= max (L(x / (A» is an element in L(y)}
where
L(y) = {(x): x can produce y}.
( 1)
(2)
The distance function satist1es fairly general regularity properties (see Fare and Grosskopf (1990) for
details), including being homogeneous ofdegree one in inputs, concave in inputs, convex in outputs,
and nondecreasing in inputs.
The distance function is perhaps most easily understood with the aid of a diagram. Consider
'While the cost function assumes cost minimizing behavior, inefficiency can be allowed
for in tbe cost function using techniques outlined by Schmidt and Sickles (1984).5
Figure 1. Observation K employs the input bundle (x;,xj) to produce output level y. The distance
function seeks tbe largest proportinnal contraction of that input bundle which allows production of the
original output level y (which may be a vector). In this example, the value of tbe distance function
,
for ohservation K is OK/OK'. This illustrates the following characteristic of the distance function,
namely
D(y,x) ;, 1 <=> x E L(y). ( 3)
Furthermore, O(y, x) = 1 if and only if the input bundle is an element of the isoquant of L(y).'
As discussed in Blackorby and Russell (1989) the tlrst derivatives of the input distance function
with respect to input quantities yield (cost-deflated) shadow or support prices of those inputs' We
use these shadow prices to test for allocative efficiency. Let w = (w " W2""'W N), where w is
positive, be the vector of observed input prices. If a school district is allocatively efficient then the
following holds:
0i(y,x)tOj (y,x) = w,twj , for all i,j = 1,2,...N. (4)
0; is the partial derivative of O(y,x) with respect to input i and is interpreted as the virtual or shadow
price of the ith input. Alternatively, we can detlne a measure K ij as the degree to which the shadow
price ratio agrees with the actual price ratio, where the formulation in (5) follows the nonminimal cost
literature,'
'The reciprocal of the value of the input distance function is the Farrell (1957) input-saving
measure of technical efficiency.
'This result follows from Shephard's (dual) lemma because the input distance function is dual
to the cost function (see Eire and Grosskopf (1990)).
-'In this literature, tlrms are assumed to minimize (unobservable) shadow costs given
(unobservable) shadow prices. This is achieved by introducing additional parameters into the cost
function that essentially allow input prices to "pivot". These parameters are used to construct the K;j6
(5)
See for example Toda (1976) or Atkinson and Halvorsen (1986).
If K ij = 1 for all i,j then the observation is said to be allocatively efticient. When K;j ;i' I we can
have the following non-optimal situations. If
(6)
factor i is underutilized relative to j at observed relative prices, and if
(7)
factor i is overutilized relative to j at observed relative prices. In tigure 2, the school district is
observed to employ input bundle X. The observed relative price of the two inputs is given by the
absolute value of the slope of the line ww. The relative shadow prices (ratio of marginal products)
that supports the input vectorx is given by the absolute value of the slope w*w*. In this case the
ratio ofshadow prices is less than the ratio of observed prices implying that input i is overutilized
relative to input j. That is, K ij < I. Based on observed relative prices, allocative efticiency occurs
at Xl, where the isoquant is tangent to the line w'w' which is parallel to the line w. Another way of
interpreting the value of K ij < I is that the marginal product per dollar paid the input j exceeds the
marginal product per dollar paid for input i at the observed input mix and prices.
in equation 5. Unlike the distance function methodology, this technique cannot identify firm-specific
relative shadow prices.7
IV, The Data
The Texas puhlic school system is particularly well suited to analyses of the relationship between
school efficiency and competition for students, The large number of school districts in the state and ,
the wealth of district-level data on school inputs and student performance support credible estimates of
school district ettlciency. Meanwhile, the school finance formula directly ties state aid to enrollment,
creating strong incentives for school districts to compete f()r students: Finally, data on enrollments
in all public school districts and accredited private schools allow us to construct reasonable measures
of the degree of competition for students,
Data for this analysis come from a variety of sources, The Texas Research League provides data
for the 1988-89 school year on Texas' lOSS public school districts, The data include information on
enrollment, the effective number of teachers, administrators, staff and teacher aides employed in each
district (per pupil), the average salaries paid to each type of employee and .other school
characteristics. The Texas Education Agency (TEA) provides information by school district on
average student achievement in reading, writing and mathematics in odd numbered grades, the
number of students taking the test battery by grade level, student ethnicity and other student body
characteristics. From these data, we construct measures of school outputs, student and family inputs
and school inputs for each school district. We construct our competition measures from TEA data on
total enrollments in all public and accredited private schools in Texas, Our demographic data come
from the 1990 Census of Housing and Population,
Together, the combined sources provide complete information on 262 urban school districts with
at least 50 students in both the 5th and 11th grades, We restrict our attention to school districts in
, During the 1988-89 school year, Texas had a complicated school finance formula that
combined a foundation grant per pupil with a guaranteed yield pel' pupil for enrichment (for details,
see Texas Research League 1989 and Salmon et al. 1988), On average, state aid represented 46,9
percent of school district spending.8
metropolitan areas because tbe Tiebout model is more appropriate to urban areas. We restrict our
attention to school districts with at least 50 students in each of the relevant grades to avoid sampling
problems that might be introduced by a small number of students.
Output Measure.l·
The literature on mea~uring school effects has reached a broad consensus that the most
appropriate measure of school output is the marginal effect of the school on educational outcomes
(see, for example, Hanushek 1986, Hanushek and Taylor 1990, Aitkin and Longford 1986 or
Boardman and Murnane 1979). We use student achievement on a battery oftest scores as the relevant
educational outcome and extract the marginal effect ofschools by following the value-added residuals
techniques described in Hanushek and Taylor and Aitkin and Longford.
Thus, we estimate school district output per pupil using Texas Educational Assessment of
Minimum Skills (TEAMS) scores in mathematics, reading and writing, data on changes in cohort
size, and demographic data on the racial and socioeconomic composition of the student body (Texas
Education Agency 1987, 1989). At the primary (5th grade) and secondary (11th grade) levels, we
estimate the per-pupil value added by the schoo! disttict according to equation (8),
MATH89,. = Ct.
2








where MATH89,g is the average TEAMS mathematics score for school district s for grade level g in
1989, TEAMS87,j(g_2) is the average TEAMS score in subject j (reading, writing and mathematics) for
the same cohort two years previously, ETHNICITY,j is the fraction of the student body ofschool
district s that is BLACK or HISPANIC (respectively), SES, is the traction ofthe student body of9
school district s that is not receiving free or reduced-price lunches (the best available proxy for socio-
economic status), XCOHORT,g is the ratio of the grade g cohort size in 1989 divided by the grade g-
2 cohort size in 1987 (a control to prevent schools from improving their average score by shedding
,
students), and the estimated residual, E,g, represents the average value added per pupil in school
district s, plus an error term.' We focus on value added in mathematics because Bishop (1992)
suggests that mathematics skills are disproportionately valued.
Estimating school outputs as equation residuals generates output measures that represent
deviations from the state average. School districts that add less value than the state average have
negative output measures. Since the distance function methodology is not designed for negative
outputs, we transform the value-added residuals' into tractable per-pupil output measures by adding the
mean of the post-test scores to the corresponding value-added residuals. To further transform the per-
pupil output measures into total output measures, we multiply by grade-level enrollment (ENROLL,,).
Therefore,
OUTPUT,g ~ (MATH89g + E,g) . ENROll,. (9)
is our proxy for the output of school district s. It represents the total achievement level we would
expect school district s to produce if it had the same student-body characteristics as the sample
average. Alternatively, one can think of OUTPUT" as the level of total student achievement purged
of the etfect of home production and earlier achievement. 10 Since we are examining value added on
achievement test scores in grades 5, and 11, there are two outputs for each school district.
"Because the two value-added equations share common regressors (ETHNICITY;.; and SES;) we
estimate the output measures simultaneously using the standard SAS package for seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR). The estimation results are presented in the appendix.
"We note that this general technique for measuring educational quality was also employed by
Grosskopf et at. 1997 and Callan and Santerre (1990). However, Callan and Santerre did not have
access to pretest information and therefore were unable to derive a value-added quality measure.10
Input Measures
We t(lCUS on two variable inputs within school district control -- instructional and administrative
personnel. We define the quantity of instructional inputs per pupil as the weighted average of the
number of teachers and teacher aides per pupil. l1 The quantity of administrative inputs per pupil is
the weighted average of the number of administrators and support personnel per pupil. 12 In both
cases, we derive weights from the average wages paid for the personnel categories in each
metropolitan area.
13 To generate measures of total instructional (INST) and administrative (NINST)
inputs, we multiply these per-pupil measures of variable input by the sum of the enrollments in grades
5 and II (ENROLL, = ENROLL" + ENROLl,l1)'
Other important school inputs are beyond school district control, at least in the near term. We
have identified two: non-labor school inputs and family inputs. Unfortunately, there are no direct
measures for either of these inputs. Because the quantity of non-labor inputs should be highly
correlated with expenditures on library books, furniture and equipment, and maintenance and
operations, we use a principle components index of per-pupil expenditures in these three categories,
multiplied by ENROLL" as our proxy for the quantity of non-labor inputs (CAPINPUT).14
We use the predicted values from equation (9) multiplied by the corresponding grade-level
"Ideally, we would like to adjust the quantity numbers for variations in teacher quality.
However, Hanushek (1986) has demonstrated that observable teacher characteristics like salary,
experience and educational background do not indicate classroom effectiveness. Lacking a reliable
indicator of teacher quality, we treat teachers as homogeneous.
"Support personnel include supervisors, counselors, librarians, nurses, physicians and special
service personnel.
co For example, if teacher aides are paid half the salary of teachers, on average, in the
metropolitan area, then each teacher aide is counted as one half of a teacher.
"CAPINPUT=ENROLL, . (0.055771 . BOOKS + 0.004722 . FURNITURE + 0.001517 .
M&O) where BOOKS is per-pupil expenditures on hooks and tilms, FURNITURE is per-pupil
expenditures for the purchase of furniture, data processing, vehicles and other equipment, and M&O
is per-pupil expenditures on plant maintenance and operation.11
enrollments (ENROLL,,) to measure the contribution of home production at each grade level
(STUINPUT,,), In essence, STUINPUT,g is an index that depends on the ethnic and socio-economic
composition of the school district, the percentage change in enrollment for each grade, and past
achievement test scores, For each school district there are two measures of tixed student inputs
corresponding to the primary and secondary grade levels.
Competition Measures
We construct two measures of the degree of competition for students, For both of our
competition measures, we use data on enrollments in bofh public and accredited private schools
(Texas Education Agency 1990, 1989). First, we construct Hertlndahl indices (His) of student
enrollment for each metropolitan statistical area (MSA). 15 The values of the Hertlndahl indices range
from less than II in the Dallas MSA to nearly 87 in the Victoria MSA. Second, we construct four-
firm concentration ratios (CRs) for each MSA,16 The concentration ratios range from less than 50
percent for the Dallas and Houston MSAs to 100 percent in fhe Bryan-College Station and Laredo
MSAs,
Area Attributes
To control for demand and monitoring factors that the literature suggests may influence school
district inefficiency, we also incorporate a number of metropolitan area characteristics, These
variables are school district enrollment (ENROLL), the square ofschool district enrollment
"The Herfindahl index for a given market is fhe sum of the squared enrollment shares for all
of the public and private school systems in that market. For ease of exposition, we multiply the values
of the Hertindahl index by 100.
"The four-tirm concentration ratio for a given market is the sum of enrollment shares for the
four largest school districts (public or private) in that market.12
(ENROLL**2), the per-pupil tax base of the school district (TAX BASE), the shares of the
population that are less than 16 years of age (UNDERI6), Catholic (CATHOLIC) and homeowners
(OWNERS) and the shares of the population over 25 that attended at least some college (COLLEGE)
or that graduated !rom high school but did not attend college (HIGH SCHOOL).
Table I presents descriptive statistics for the data used in this analysis.
V. Estimation
The translog cost function has a long history of use in estimating cost functions because of its
t1exibility and ability to nest various hypotheses within its structure. In this analysis we use a translog
form for the distance function. Suppressing the observational subscript,
In D = a + L ~j Inxj + Y, L L ~jk Inxj lnJs, + L L Pjm Inxj InYm
j j k j m
+ ~ ~ y. Inx. Inz + ~ &)nz + Y, ~ ~ &. Inz Inz. (lOa) LJLJ Jr J r LJ r ~.L, f) r J
j r r r j
+ LL v,m Inz, InYm + L )..m InYm + Y, LL )..mn InYmlnyn+ E.
, m m m n
where In 0 equals zero, xj is the quantity for discretionary inputs (lNST and NINST), Z. is the
quantity for non-discretionary inputs (STUINPUT 5' STUINPUT II' and CAPINPUT) and ym are the
output quantities (OUTPUT 5 and OUTPUT11)' We impose homogeneity in the discretionary inputs
0:iJ j = 1, L: iJ j k = 0, L: Pj m = 0, L: 'Yj, = 0) as required by the definition ofthe input distance
function (Fare and Grosskopf, 1990).
One advantage of the translog specification is that by Shepherd's lemma the fIrst derivative of
(lOa) with respect to XI equals the expenditure share for input 1 (~ = "I X, I(w, X, + '" ~ )). Because
estimating the distance function and the share equation together in a system of simultaneous equations
would improve the efilciency of the estimated parameters, we use the observed input quantities and
the average prices for teachers and administrators (P=w,!w,) in each metropolitan area to defIne13
instructional expenditure shares (5,) for each observation. We use the ratio of average prices to
derive expenditure shares rather than the observed relative prices because the observed prices may
include rents. 17
Thus, we estimate the following system of equations:
In D ~ CL + L ~j Inxj + Y, L L ~jk Inxj Inxk + L L Pjm Inxj Inym
J J 1: J m
+ L L Y i' Inxj lnz, + L 1\,Inz, + Y, L L 1\,j lnz, lnzj
j , , , j (lOb)
+ L L v,m lnz, InYm + L /..m lnYm + y, L L /..= InYm Iny.+ E,
r m m m :n
51 ~ ~l + ~lllnxl + ~121nx, + L Pl)nym + L Yl)nz, + I!
m
using restricted least squares to accommodate the nonvariance of the left hand side ofthe first
equation (Hayes et al. 1995)."
Because expenditure shares by definition sum to one, the predicted values from the instructional
share equation (together with the variable input quantities and the ratios of average prices P=w,!wj )
provide sufficient information to generate a point estimate of Kfor each school district (K,).'9 If K, >
I « I) then the wage-deflated marginal product of instructors is greater than (less than) the wage-
deflated marginal product of administrative staff. We use the value of K, as our measure of allocative
"Implicitly, this approach assumes that although wage levels may vary among school districts
in a metropolitan area, teachers and administrators receive the same compensating differential (in
percentage terms).
'" In addition to the restrictions needed to satisfy the homogeneity conditions (L {3 j I,
L{3 j k = 0, LPj m = 0, L'Yj, = 0), we also impose symmetry (e.g. ~ k =/3,j ).
" With some rearrangement, the definition of K12 given in equation 5 becomes
wbere x, in IN5TR and X2 is NIN5T. Because there are only two variable inputs under consideration,
we have dropped the subscripts on K indicating input type.14
ineft1ciency: the farther K, is from 1, the greater is the difference between the market price and the
observed price and the more allocatively inefticient is the school district.
To isolate the relationship between competition and inefticiency, we regress our measure of
,
allocative inefticiency against a measure of competition (either the Hert1ndahllndex or the the four-
firm concentration ratio) and the various school and metropolitan area attributes (ENROLL,
ENROLL**2, TAX BASE, UNDER16, CATHOLIC, OWNERS, COLLEGE and HIGH SCHOOL).
For the purposes of these regressions, allocative inefticiency is measured as the ahsolute value of (K, -
1).20 After transformation, our measure of allocative inefticiency (I K, -Ill has been multiplied by
100 for ease ofexposition. As I", -1 :*100 increases, allocative inefficiency increases.
To allow for non-linearities in the relationship between competition and inefticiency, we follow a
"switching regimes" technique suggested by White (1976) and Alexander (1994). Thus, we create a
dummy variable (denoted DSwitch) that takes on the value of one for market concentration measures
that are greater than or equal to a critical value (20) and search sequentially for the Zo that maximizes
the log likelihood function conditional on Zo.21
This approach creates three challenges. First, the standards errors for (lOb) will be incorrect
co Recall that allocative efticiency implies that K, = 1.
" The log likelihood function is
T, T
" , " e'
T L...,e" TT L...,,,
r; TIt 1 - 1 t-T +1 Log L=-Tlog(y(21t))- - - -log(---) -(--) log( , )
2 2 T, 2 T-T,15
because tbe regression includes generated regressors. Second, statistical significance can not be
determined for our measures of allocative inefficiency (KJ because they represent transformations of
the predicted values from (lOb). Third, we cannot obtain unconditional standard errors for tbe
coefticient~ in the switching regressions because tbe critical value (zo) is determined endogenously by
a sequential search.
A nested bootstrap allows us to address each of these challenges. Specifically, we create 250 data
sets (of 262 observations each) based on random draws with replacement from the original data. We
tben replicate each stage of the analysis 250 times-one replication for each of the 250 data sets.
Tbus, equation (8) is re-estimated 250 times. In turn, the resulting OUTPUT,g and STUINPUT,g
measures are used to re-estimate (lOb). Appendix Tables 1 and 2 present information about the
distribution of coefficient estimates from equations (8) and (lOb).
Each estimate of (lOb) yields a distribution of K,. Thus, we can use the switching regressions
technique discussed above to estimate the relationship in each of our 250 replicated data sets between
our estimates of inefticiency (K, ) and our measures of competition. Using the replicated data sets in
this way allows us to generate distributions not only of the coefficient estimates from the switching
regressions, but also of the endogenous critical values (Zo).
VI. Result~
Table 2 presents our results for four different models of school district eft1ciency. Model I
excludes any measure of market concentration. Model II adds an intercept dummy (DSwitch) to the
estimation of Model I. DSwitch equals one whenever market concentration equals or exceeds Zo (and
zero otherwise). Model III replaces DSwitch with an interaction term (DSwitch X market
concentration). The interaction term takes on the value of the market concentration variable whenever
market concentration equals or exceeds the critical value Zo (and zero otherwise). 11''1>=0, there is no16
switch, and Model III is a simple linear model including a market concentration variable. Model IV
adds a non-switching market concentration variable to Model ilL Table 2a presents our results using
the Herfindahl index as the measure of market concentration; tahle 2b presents the results for the
four-firm concentration ratio.
As tables 2a and 2b illustrate, we find systematic evidence that school district inetticiency retlects
competitive pressures. Across the various specifications, the positive coetticient on the measure of
market concentration indicates that allocative inefficiency rises with market concentration.
Furthermore, our evidence suggests that the relationship is non-linear-the likelihood function is
maximized with a switching point at a Herfindahl index of27.61 (or equivalently at a four-firm
concentration ratio of 83.65). By this criterion, nearly half of the metropolitan areas in Texas
(containing 20 percent of the urban school districts and enrollments in our sample) are highly
concentrated markets.
Model IV also indicates that allocative ineftlciency increases with market concentration whenever
the Herfindahl index is above the critical level; below the critical level there is no relationship
between allocative inefticiency and market concentration. Thus, we find evidence that increased
competition could·enhance the efficiency ofschool districts in concentrated markets, but would have
little systematic effect On school districts in competitive markets.
The switching regressions also suggest that school districts in highly concentrated markets are
substantially more allocatively inefficient than school districts in competitive markets. Table 3
compares the predicted efficiency scores for school districts in highly concentrated markets with the
predicted efticiency scores for school districts in competitive metropolitan areas. Evaluating the
models at the means of the other regressors, we find that markets with Herfindahl indices
(concentration ratios) at or above the critical value have predicted inefticiency scores at least 50
percent higher than markets with Hertindahl indices (concentration ratios) below the critical value.l7
On average, school districts in concentrated markets are more than twice as allocatively inefficient as
school districts in competitive metropolitan areas (using either measure of competition).
Interestingly, the analysis does not support the notion that school district size int1uences allocative
inefticiency. Enrollment and enrollment squared are individually insignificant in all of the models.
Furthermore, evaluated at the mean of enrollment, the partial derivative of the models with respect to
enrollment (aEnroll) is insignificantly different from zero.
Vll. Conclusions
Policies that foster competition among school districts have been proposed as a partial solution to
the problem of school inefticiency. However, school districts already face competition for
enrollments from private schools and other area public schools. If inefticiency in the school system
could be reduced by increasing the degree of competition among schools, then we would expect to
find evidence that school districts that currently face a lot of competition are more efticient than
school districts that currently face less competition.
Using an input distance function to model the relationship among the multiple inputs and multiple
outputs of Texas school districts, we tlnd substantial evidence that increased competition for
enrollments could enhance the efticiency of school districts in concentrated markets. On average,
school districts in highly concentrated markets are more than twice as allocatively inefticient as school
districts in competitive markets. However, only 20 percent of the urban school districts in our
sample are located in highly concentrated markets. Thus, while our analysis offers support for the
notion that increased school competition-fostered either hy vouchers or charter schools-would
improve school efticiency in some metropolitan areas, our analysis also suggests that increased
competition is not a panacea.IS
Tahle 1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
ENROLL, 676.16 1209.57 51.00 13121.00
MATH89, 825.75 34.38 713.00 915.00
TEAMS87,=ili,5 835.27 36.39 707.00 944.00
TEAMS87 ,~,"",.5 801.92 40.74 618.00 914.00
TEAMS87wc;,mg.' 758.89 36.99 613.00 865.00
XCOHORT, 99.48 8.56 79.80 128.07
ENROLLll 545,18 900.80 50.00 8521.00
MATH89ll 774.96 27.58 692.00 851.00
TEAMS87=ili,lI 788.42 30.45 702.00 893.00
TEAMS87 ,~,"'g,ll 789.22 27.36 711.00 869,00
TEAMS87wri'IDg,lI 745.38 35,24 668.00 861.00
XCOHORTll 81.12 10.14 50.00 112,70
BLACK 10.59 14,04 0,00 89.40
HISPANIC 24.88 29,57 0,10 98.80
SES 69.06 23.75 2.41 100.00
NINST 11.30 19.50 0,85 211.89
INST 73.11 122.97 6.70 1291.76
P 1.61 0.05 1.47 1.73
CAPINPUT 1885.55 3348.02 72.49 31062.68
HERFINDAHL 20,81 14.24 10.91 86.63
CONCENTRATION RATIO 65.76 15.54 47.34 100.00
TAXBASE (millions per pupil) 0,18 0.12 0.02 1.07
ENROLL (thousands) 9,77 17.82 .80 190,29
UNDER16 27.01 2.52 20.48 34.62
CATHOLIC 21.31 21.57 1.10 81.00
OWNER 59,93 6.14 41.87 70,80
COLL SHR 47.97 7.97 27,00 61.65
HIGH SHR 25.30 3.67 16.46 34.24Table 2a
Allocative Inet11ciency and the Hertlndah1 Index
Modell Model II Model III Model IV
Intercept 5.92 '-0.50 -0.25 3.52
(-5.44, 18.71) (-12.76, 13.65) (-11.69, 12.78) (-10.33, 16.25)
DSwitch 2.15
(129,2.89)
DSwitch X HI 0.04 0.08
(0.02, 0.06) (0.03, 0.13)
Herfindah1 -0.05
Index (-0.11,0.01)
Tax Base -3.34 -2.21 -2.39 -2.30
(-4.90, -1.99) (-3.36, -0.68) (-3.66, -0.95) (-3.56, -0.75)
Owner 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11
(0.02, 0.23) (0.04, 0.21) (0.04, 0.22) (0.01, 0.22)
Under 16 -0.05 0.01 0.04 -0.04
(-0.33,0.17) (-0.30, 0.25) (-0.29, 0.29) (-0.38, 0.40)
College -0.04 0.01 0.001 -0.005
(-0.13,0.06) (-0.10,0.11) (-0.09, 0.10) (-0.11,0.09)
High School -0.24 -0.19 -0.20 -0.21
(-0.39, -0.09) (-0.34, -009) (-0.34, -0.10) (-035, -0.10)
Catholic -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(-0.05, 0.02) (-0.05, 0.02) (-0.05, 0.02) (-0.06, 0.03)
Enroll -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(-0.04, 0.01) (-0.05,0.002) (-0.05,0.003) (-0.05,0.001)
Enroll**2 3E-5 8E-5 9E-5 9E-5
(-IE-4,5E-4) (-6E-5,5E-4) (-5E-5, 7E-4) (-5E-5,7E-4)
aEnroll 3E-4 8E-4 9E-4 9E-4
(-0001,0.004) (-7E-4,5E-3) (-5E-4,6E-3) (-5E-4,6E-3)
Log L -5312 -491.3 -493.4 -491.0
(-560.8, -506.5) (-514.9,461.6) (-516.7, -464.0) (-514.2, -462.0)
Zo 27.61 27.61 27.61
(13.03,27.61) (1303,27.61) (12.77,27.61)
note: median coefficient values. The 5th and 95th percentile values are in parentheses.
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Allocative Inefficiency and the Concentration Ratio
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Intercept 5.92 ' -0.25 0.19 2.09
(-5.44, 18.71) (-12.64, 13.84) (-11.89,14.63) (-10.61, 18.69)
DSwitch 2.13
(1.16,2.86)
DSwitch X CR 0.02 0.02
(O.OJ, 0.03) (-0.05, 0.04)
Concentration 0.01
Ratio (-0.04,0.16)
Tax Base -3.34 -2.21 -2.29 -2.26
(-4.90, -1.99) (-3.41, -0.68) (-374, -0.82) (-3.63,0.72)
Owner 0.11 0.12 0,11 0,10
(0,02, 0.23) (0.02,0.21) (0,01,0,21) (-0.02,0.23)
Under 16 -0.05 0,01 0.02 -0.02
(-0.33, 0.17) (-0.31, 0.25) (-0.31,0.32) (-0.42,0.28)
College -0,04 0,01 0,01 -0.01
(-0.13, 0.06) (-0.10,0.11) (-0.10,0,11) (-0,16,0.09)
High School -0.24 -0.20 -0.20 -0.23
(-0.39, -0.09) (-0.33, -0,09) (-0.34, -0.09) (-0.37, -0.09)
Catholic -0.02 -0.01 -0,02 -0.02
(-0.05,0.02) (-0.05, 002) (-0,06, 0,02) (-0,07, 0.02)
Enroll -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(-0.04, 0.01) (-0.05, 0.003) (-0.05,0.003) (-0.05, 0.002)
Enroll**2 3E-5 8E-5 8E-5 9E-5
(-IE-4, 5E-4) (-7E-5, 5E-4) (-7E-5, 5E-4) (-6E-5, 7E-4)
aEnroli 3E-4 8E-4 8E-4 9E-4
(-0.001,0,004) (-7E-4, 5E-3) (-7E-4,5E-3) (-6E-4, 6E-3)
Log L -531.2 -491.2 -492.0 -487.9
(-560.8, -506.5) (-514.9, -461.6) (-516.7, -4623) (-515.5, -459.6)
Zo 83.65 83.65 74.73
(49.69, 83.65) (49.69, 83.65) (49.69,83.77)
note: Median coefficient values, The 5th and 95th percentile values are in parentheses.
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Modelll Model III Model IV
Hertlndahl index
2.33 1.53 2.63
(1.64, 2.55) (1.20, I.85) (1.31, 4.36)
Concentration ratio
2.31 1.98 1.70
(1.64, 2.55) (1.50,2.51) (0.23,3.72)
note: Median predicted ratios.
The 5th and 95th percentile values are in parentheses.
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5th median 95th 5th median 95th
percentile percentile percentile percentile
Intercept 38] .42 507.99 638.77 192.66 250.89 312.97
TEAMS87'~lh.j 0.02 0.18 0.35 0.30 0.39 0.48
TEAMS87 ,~di"gj -0.20 0.Q3 0.24 0.09 0.20 0.33
TEAMS87wri,",g.; 0.04 0.24 0.41 0.04 0.10 0.16
BLACK -0.46 -0.23 0.06 -0.43 -0.29 -0. ]3
HISPANIC -0.29 -0.08 0.19 -0.17 -0.03 0.10
XCOHORTj -0.83 -0.49 -0.19 -0.61 -0.41 -0.19
SES 0.04 0.32 0.66 0.Q7 0.25 0.4327
Appendix Table 2
Estimates ofthe Translog Input Distance Function
5th percentile median 95th percentile
INTERCEPT -1.695 1.897 5.004
iXI 0.495 0.503 0.514
iX2 0.486 0.497 0.507
iYI -3.434 2.907 9067
iY2 -4.475 1.480 8.213
iRI -8.847 -2.855 2.556
iR2 -8.243 -0.473 5.121
iR3 -2.171 -1.309 -0.549
iXleXI/2 0.151 0.155 0.158
iXleX2 -0.158 -0.155 -0.151
iXUX2/2 0.151 0.155 0.158
iXleYI -0.004 0.008 0.020
EXleY2 -0.020 -0.008 0.004
eXleRI -0.027 -0.014 -0.001
EXleR2 0.002 0.016 0.029
eXIiR3 -0.003 -0.001 0.001
iXUYI -0.020 -0.008 0.004
EXUY2 -0.004 0.008 0.020
EXURI 0.001 0.014 0.027
iXUR2 -0.029 -0.016 -0.002
EXUR3 -0.0001 0.001 0.003
iYlEYI -13.067 -5.215 3.248
iYIiY2 -6.409 2.897 14.667
iYIiRI -6.855 10.409 25.756
EYIiR2 -15.383 -3.780 6.451
iYIiR3 -0.711 0.431 1.498
EYUY2 -5.390 -1.079 3.303
EY2ERI -12.536 -0.992 8.852
EY2ER2 -9.580 -0.500 8.043
EY2ER3 -0.802 0.083 1.116
ERIiRI -12.721 -5.053 3.770
ERIiR2 -10.051 1.108 13.204
eRleR3 -1.576 -0.533 0.514
eRUR2 -2.751 1.153 6.201
iRUR3 -0.922 0.144 1.050
eR3ER3 -0. I18 -0.056 0.001Figure 1
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